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Abstract
In this paper, a game theory based cooperation scheme is investigated to enhance the physical layer
security in both primary and secondary transmissions of a cognitive radio network (CRN). In CRNs,
the primary network may decide to lease its own spectrum for a fraction of time to the secondary nodes
in exchange of appropriate remuneration. We consider the secondary transmitter node as a trusted relay
for primary transmission to forward primary messages in a decode-and-forward (DF) fashion and, at
the same time, allows part of its available power to be used to transmit artificial noise (i.e., jamming
signal) to enhance primary and secondary secrecy rates. In order to allocate power between message
and jamming signals, we formulate and solve the optimization problem for maximizing the secrecy
rates under malicious attempts from EDs. We then analyse the cooperation between the primary and
secondary nodes from a game-theoretic perspective where we model their interaction as a Stackelberg
game with a theoretically proved and computed Stackelberg equilibrium. We show that the spectrum
leasing based on trading secondary access for cooperation by means of relay and jammer is a promising
framework for enhancing security in CRNs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, physical layer (PHY) security has drawn significant attention as an alternative for
cryptographic algorithms at the upper layers of protocol stack in secure communication systems
[1–3] . Security threats may be induced by the passive eavesdropping node(s) which try to
intercept the communication between authenticated nodes. Traditionally, there have been several
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significant challenges for cryptographic approaches of upper layers in protocol stacks, e.g., private
key management complexity, key distribution obstacles, and key transmission security issues.
Recent years, a promising approach towards achieving secure communications has been devel-
oped by Wyner in [4]: information theoretic secrecy. The idea of information theoretic secrecy
lies in exploiting the randomness of the communication channels to ensure the secrecy of the
transmitted messages. In PHY security, the figure of merit is secrecy rate defined as which
is the difference between the transmission rate of the source-destination link and that of the
source-eavesdropper link. However, the secrecy rate would be equal to zero when the source-
destination channel is worse than the source-eavesdropper channel. For a Gaussian channel, the
achievable secrecy rate equals to the difference between the mutual information accumulated at
the destination and that accumulated at the eavesdropper (ED), which is not less than zero [5].
In addition, many recent studies have focused on particular interest of the cooperative jamming
paradigm. Since the open nature of the wireless medium makes it susceptible to malicious
eavesdropping. In [6], the authors proposed cooperative jamming to counter this vulnerability
which is caused by eavesdroppers. In cooperative jamming, includes interference is created
by the network nodes to transmit noise or codewords to impair the eavesdroppers’ ability in
decoding the confidential information [7]. The authors in [8] considered the power allocation
optimization problem to maximize the secrecy rate in a two hop wireless relay network. The
work in [9] maximized the secrecy rate of the primary network while satisfying a required rate
for the secondary network by using the optimal beamformer design at the secondary transmitter
with multiple antennas.
The work in [10] considered the secrecy rate maximization problem based on game theory,
where the jammer introduces pricing charges for its jamming service based on the amount of the
interference caused to the eavesdropper. This secrecy rate maximization problem is formulated
into a Stackelberg game where the jammer and the legitimate transmitter play the roles of leader
and follower of the game. In [11], the authors demonstrated that cooperative jamming leads
to substantial secrecy rate improvement. This study involved multiple potential jammers, their
competition between which are modeled for bandwidth access via distributed resource allocation
mechanisms such as auctioning and the power control game. With the goal of maximizing their
data transmission rate priced by the jammer’s power, the transmit power of cooperative jammers
is generally proportional to the amount of leased bandwidth. In [12], the authors considered a
scenario where an external eavesdropper attempts to decode the primary users message. The
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primary user allows the secondary user to share the primary user’s spectrum to improve its
own secrecy rate through cooperative jamming from the secondary user. A different setup is
investigated in [33], the secondary user wants to keep its message confidential from the primary
network, which means that the primary receiver is viewed as an eavesdropper from the secondary
network perspective. In [14], the inner and outer bounds on the capacity equivocation region are
derived.
Recently, there has been a growing interest in modeling and analyzing communication systems
using game-theoretic approaches. The authors in [15] considered a four-node cognitive scenario
where the secondary receiver (SR) is treated as a potential eavesdropper with respect to the
primary transmission. The secondary transmitter can help the primary transmission, while guar-
antee that the primary message is not leaked to the secondary user(s). They investigated three
different optimization problems: the maximization of the primary secrecy rate, the maximization
of the secondary rate and the minimization of the secondary transmit power. Furthermore, they
analyzed the cooperation between the primary transmitter (PT) and secondary transmitter (ST)
from a game-theoretic perspective, in which their interaction is modeled as a Stackelberg game.
It is known that the primary and secondary users have their own interests and thus do not
cooperate unconditionally, non-cooperative game theory tools are a common approach to model
their interaction in cognitive radio networks (CRNs) with secrecy constraints [16] or without
secrecy constraints [17], [18]. An appropriate model for such scenarios is the Stackelberg game
model [19] with the game leader selling some fraction of its spectrum and the follower awarded
a share of the spectrum for its cooperation, as in [20].
Cooperative game theory was studied in [22] to demonstrate the improvement in secrecy
capacity of an ad-hoc network, when users form coalitions to nullify the signals overheard by
eavesdroppers via collaborative beamforming. For a hierarchical multi-hop system with different
potential paths to the base station, a distributed tree formation game was proposed in [23].
Han et al. [24] demonstrated Stackelberg game where a legal transmitter pays a number of
external helpers to jam an eavesdropper, and computed the corresponding equilibrium prices
and convergence properties. They also examined a similar scenario in [25], where an auction
game was used alternatively to model the transactions between transmitters and helping jammers.
Anand and Chandramouli studied an M -user non-cooperative power control game with secrecy
considerations in [26], and applied pricing functions to improve the energy efficiency and
sum secrecy capacity of the network. Fakoorian et al. discussed in [27] and [28] how Kalai-
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Smorodinsky bargaining solutions and zero-sum games are adopted to allow the transmitters to
find an operating point that balances network performance and fairness. In [29], game theory is
used by multiple eavesdroppers to decide whether to collude or not in a MISO wiretap channel.
The authors in [30] modeled the interaction between primary users and secondary users as a
Stackelberg game in which transmission power levels are the key to maximize data rates. Also,
the study in [33] considers cognitive transmitter should ensure that the primary message is not
leaked to the secondary user by using cooperative jamming. The authors of this study investigate
the optimal power allocation and power splitting at the secondary transmitter for cognitive model
to maximize the secondary energy efficiency (EE) under secrecy constraints.
From the above mentioned studies, it can be shown that the ST can be utilized as either a relay
to forward the primary information or a jammer to send jamming signal. The target is to enhance
primary secrecy rate and improve secondary transmission rate. Inspired by [8], we propose a
novel scenario where ED can intercept the primary and secondary transmissions, ST is acted
as a trusted relay and jammer by allocating part of its transmitted power to emit an artificial
noise to create interference to EDs to protect the primary and secondary transmissions. The
main benefit of this novel scenario is to protect the primary and secondary transmissions against
eavesdroppers whereas previous studies highlighted only protection of primary transmissions
against eavesdroppers. We assume that primary receiver (PR) and SR have knowledge of artificial
noise to overcome the artificial noise at a legal receiver.
We study two scenarios where Stackelberg game theory based cooperative scheme is used to
improve the achievable primary secrecy rate (PSR) and secondary secrecy rate (SSR). In scenario
1, a single ED is considered as shown in Fig.1, where the PT broadcasts its encoded signal to
ST in Phase 1 with an assumption that the ED is out of range of PT; then the ST forwards the
primary message with artificial noise to the PR in Phase 2; and the ST sends its own signal
with artificial noise to SR in Phase 3. In this scenario, we applied Stackelberg game to analyze
the primary secrecy rate in Phase 2, and the secondary secrecy rate in Phase 3. Different from
the transmission scheme in scenario 1, in scenario 2 as indicated in Fig. 2, the SR is applied
as multi-antenna jammer in Phase 1 to reduce leakage rate at eavesdroppers. Furthermore, in
scenario 2, we consider the following two types of multiple eavesdroppers as follows:
• Colluding eavesdroppers: All eavesdroppers can be seen as a single eavesdropper due to
their joint processing action, and the optimal receiver strategy is based on maximum ratio
combining which combines the effects of all eavesdroppers in deriving closed forms of PSR
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Fig. 1: Illustration of cognitive radio (CR) system model in Scenario 1.
and SSR [21].
• Non-colluding eavesdroppers: The secrecy rate is determined by that of the most mali-
cious eavesdropper, considering that each eavesdropper overhears the primary or secondary
communication individually.
In such networks, a primary node may lease portions of a licensed spectrum to a secondary
node in exchange for some form of compensation. Moreover, retribution from secondary to
primary nodes is in the form of cooperative relaying and jamming to enhance primary secret
transmission. This scenario avoids the regulatory issues or money transactions that commonly
hinder the implementation of the property-rights spectrum leasing concept [39].
In the context of the aforementioned schemes, we propose novel system designs, the power
allocation and the time allocation designs for primary and secondary transmissions that maximize
the achievable PSR and SSR subject to a total transmit power constraint. We should note that
codeword design for meeting the achievable secrecy rates is not considered in this work. The
main contributions of this work are summarized as follow:
• In Scenario 1, with a single eavesdropper, we provide an efficient optimization maximize
both PSR and SSR under the flat fading channel model. In particular, we analyze and solve
the primary and secondary power allocation problems at the ST using time slot allocation
of spectrum lease.
• In Scenario 1, it is shown that our secrecy rates achieved with our proposed 3-phase system
is higher than of other studies ([11], [13]) which are based on external jammer under the
same geometric environment.
• In Scenario 2, we study design and analysis for the proposed CRNs under the malicious
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Fig. 2: Illustration of CR system model in Scenario 2.
attempt of multiple eavesdroppers (colluding eavesdroppers and non-colluding eavesdrop-
pers) around ST to highlight the impact of multiple eavesdroppers on the PSR and SSR.
We analyze and solve the power allocation problem and time allocation problem.
• In Scenario 2, it is shown that the secrecy rate achieved for CRNs under the colluding
eavesdropper is significantly lower than that under non-colluding eavesdroppers.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we define our system
model and achievable secrecy rates in cognitive Scenario 1. Section III presents the possible
optimization problems for the given scenarios and their game-theoretic approach in Scenario 2.
We then compare those scenarios through numerical simulations in Section IV. Finally, Section
V concludes this paper.
II. ENHANCING SECRECY RATES USING STACKELBERG GAME: A SINGLE EAVESDROPPER
(SCENARIO 1)
In this section, we considered a cooperative CRNs where the ST is allowed to access the
primary spectrum, as long as it acted as the jammer for the ED and the relay for the primary
transmission as illustrated in Fig. 1, consisting of the following single antenna nodes: a PT,
a PR, a cognitive ST, an SR and a single ED (i.e., Scenario 1). We assume that the legal
primary and secondary destinations have a priori knowledge of the jamming signal sent by the
ST (relay). This is achieved by communicating the legal source and destination in a two-step
process. In the first step, the phase response of the channel is probed, and in the second step the
information bearing signal is modified to precompensate for the phase effects of the channel.
Since the channels between the legal source and destination are completely different from the
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channels between the legal source and eavesdroppers, this process is secure ([34], [35]). We
assume the following: i) each node carries a single omnidirectional antenna; ii) the relaying
strategy of decode-and-forward (DF) is employed; and iii) global channel state information
(CSI) is available by a standard channel estimation (CE) technique, e.g., the training based CE
(TBCE). In TBCE technique, the pilot symbols are used for acquiring an estimated CSI prior
to actual data transmission, then the channel is estimated using the combined knowledge of the
transmitted and received signals [37] and [38]. To enhance the achievable secrecy rate, the ST
allocates part of its transmit power to emit jamming signal, and the rest of its transmit power
to emit information signal.
For the transmit single message W , which is uniformly distributed over
{
1, . . . , 2nR
}
with
R as the rate of communication, and the n is the block length of communication. The sender
maps W to Xn = X1, . . . , Xn, the intended receiver receives Y n = Y1, . . . , Yn and decodes
Wˆ , and eavesdropper overhears the output Zn = Z1, . . . , Zn. The perfect secrecy rate Rsec is
considered as achievable if for any  > 0, there exists a sequence of codes (2nR, n) such that
for any n > n(), we have [40]
P ne = P
(
W 6= Wˆ
)
≤ , Re = 1
n
H (W |Zn) ≥ Rsec − ε, (1)
where Re is the equivocation rate.
The secrecy capacity Csec is defined as the maximum achievable perfect secrecy rate, which
is given as
Csec
∆
= sup
Pne ≤ε
Rsec = max
fW
[I(X, Y )− I(X,Z)]+. (2)
The achievable secrecy rate can be defined as
Rsec =[max
fW
(I(X, Y ))−max
fW
(I(X,Z))]+
=(RD −RE)+, (3)
where RD is the maximum information rate from the transmitter to the intended receiver, and
RE is the maximum leakage rate from the transmitter to the eavesdropper. For convenience, we
remove the (·)+ sign from here on.
A. Proposed Cooperative CRNs
Our system has three phases as follows:
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1) Phase 1: The PT decides to allocate only a fraction (1 − α) of the whole time slot for
transmission from the PT to the ST (where 0 < α < 1.). The remaining fraction will be used in
Phases 2 and 3. We assume that transmission from the PT is invisible at the ED. The PT encodes
a confidential message into a N−length block codeword (s), where PT has power constraint as
follows [30]:
Pp =
1
N
N∑
k=1
|sk|2 ≤ PMAX , (4)
where PMAX is the maximum primary power of PT. In phase I, the ST is used as a relay and
the received signal at ST is
XST =
√
Pphpss+ nST , (5)
where s is the primary message signal, Pp is the primary power level, nST ∼ CN (0, σ2) is the
noise at ST, and hps ∼ CN (0, σ2h) is the channel coefficient between PT and ST. For notational
convenience, let us define
ρps =
Pp |hps|2
σ2
.
Then, the information rate at the ST, RPS, is obtained as
RPS = (1− α) log2(1 + ρps). (6)
2) Phase 2: The ST then forwards secure primary message to the PR within the fraction αβ
(where 0 < β < 1) of the considered time slot1. In this phase, for security reason, the ST also
sends the artificial noise (denoted by z)2 using a faction (1− ) of the available power level Ps
(where 0 <  < 1). Furthermore, the ST encodes a confidential message into same a n−length
block codeword of phase 1, where ST has power constrained as follows
Ps =
1
n
n∑
k=1
|sˆk|2 ≤ Ps,MAX , (7)
where Ps,MAX is the maximum secondary power of ST. The received signal at the PR after
removing the artificial noise (which is assumed to be known at the PR) is
XPR =
√
Pshspsˆ+ nPR, (8)
1We consider a single ST only in this work. However, for the case of multiple STs, the relay selection process can be applied
before the most competitive ST can be chosen to deliver the message to the PR
2Note that the PR could also do the same thing in Phase 1 by sending the artificial noise to interfere with the reception of
eavesdropper in Phase 1. This will certainly improve secure rate, however, at the expense of more power consumption.
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and the received signal at the ED in Phase 2 is
X
(2)
ED =
√
Pshsesˆ+
√
(1− )Pshsez + nED, (9)
where sˆ is the re-encoded primary message signal, the artificial noise z ∼ CN (0, 1), hsp ∼
CN (0, σ2h) is the channel coefficient between the ST and the PR, and hse ∼ CN (0, σ2h) is
the channel coefficient between the ST and the ED. After removing the artificial noise, the
information rate at PR is obtained as
RSP = αβ log2(1 + ρsp), (10)
where
ρsp =
Ps |hsp|2
σ2
.
Then the information leakage at the ED in Phase 2 is
R
(2)
SE = αβ log2(
(1 + ρse)
(1 + (1− )ρse)), (11)
where
ρse =
Ps |hse|2
σ2
.
According to [8], the achievable PSR, denoted by RPSEC , can be written as
RPSEC = RSP −R(2)SE
= αβ(log2(1 + ρsp)− log2(
(1 + ρse)
(1 + (1− )ρse))). (12)
3) Phase 3: The ST then send its own secure secondary message to the SR within the remaining
faction α(1 − β) of the considered time slot. Again, we assume that the same codeword for
artificial noise and the same power allocation strategy (i.e., same ) are used for this secondary
transmission to simplify our analysis. The received signal at the SR (after removing the artificial
noise) is
XSR =
√
Pshsss1 + nSR, (13)
while the received signal at the ED in phase 3 is
X
(3)
ED =
√
Pshses1 +
√
(1− )Pshsez + nED, (14)
where s1 is the secondary message signal and hss ∼ CN (0, σ2h) is the channel coefficient between
the ST and SR. After removing the artificial noise at SR, the information rate at the SR is
represented as
RSS = α(1− β) log2(1 + ρss), (15)
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where
ρss =
Ps |hss|2
σ2
.
Also, the leakage rate at the ED in this phase can be written as
R
(3)
SE = α(1− β) log2(
(1 + ρse)
(1 + (1− )ρse)). (16)
Similarly, we can obtain SSR, denoted by RSSEC as
RSSEC = RSS −R(3)SE
= α(1− β)
(
log2(1 + ρss)− log2
(
(1 + ρse)
(1 + (1− )ρse)
))
. (17)
B. Maximization of Achievable Secrecy Rates Using Stackelberg Game
We can formulate the maximization problem of available secrecy rates as a Stackelberg game
where the PT is considered as the leader and the ST is the follower. The leader will try to
maximize its primary secrecy rate Rpsec while the follower will try to maximize its utility. The
PT’s optimal transmission parameters (α∗, β∗) and the corresponding power choice of the ST,
∗, are jointly referred as the Stackelberg equilibrium. We can consider interaction between the
primary and secondary transmissions as shown in Fig. 3. The ST is aware of parameters (α, β)
Fig. 3: Stackelberg game model
and optimizes its power level towards the goal of maximizing its utility:
USSEC(α, β, (α, β)) = RSSEC − k, (18)
where k is the pricing constant. We present the following lemma.
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Lemma 1. The utility of secondary transmission in (18) is concave in terms of .
Proof: In order to prove the concavity of the secondary transmission’s utility, we derive the
second derivative of (18) with respect to  as
∂2USSEC
∂2
= q
(
− ρ
2
ss
(1 + ρss)2
− ρ
2
se
(1 + (1− )ρse)2
)
, (19)
where q = α(1−β)/(ln 2). Obviously, the second derivative in (19) is negative. Thus, the utility
of the secondary transmission is concave in terms of .
The optimal solution of secondary transmission problem can be obtained as follows
∗ = arg max
0<α,β,<1
USSEC(α, β, (α, β)). (20)
To find optimum ∗, we can differentiate Ussec with respect to  and equate it to zero, as follows:
∂USSEC
∂
= q
(
ρss
(1 + ρss)
− ρse
(1 + (1− )ρse)
)
− k = 0
⇒ k/q = ρss
(1 + ρss)
− ρse
(1 + (1− )ρse) (21)
After simplification, we can obtain  as
a2 + b+ c = 0, (22)
where
a = ρssρse, (23)
b = ρse − ρss − ρssρse − 2ρssρseq
k
, (24)
c =
q
c1
(ρss − ρse + ρssρse)− ρse − 1. (25)
Therefore, the optimal ∗ is
∗ =

0, 2 ≤ 0
1, 1 ≤ 1
max∈{1,2} Ussec(), 0 ≤ 1 ≤ 2 ≤ 1
max∈{0,1,i} Ussec(), only i ∈ [0, 1], i = 1 or 2
(26)
where
1 =
−b−√b2 − 4ac
2a
, 2 =
−b+√b2 − 4ac
2a
.
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The PT, acting as the game leader, determines the fraction α and the ratio β towards the goal
of maximizing its secrecy rate, knowing that its decision will affect the strategy selected by the
ST (the follower). The solution is given as
α∗, β∗ = arg max
0<α,β,<1
RPSEC(α, β, 
∗(α, β)) (27)
Theorem 1. The allocated power level ∗ and time slot α∗ are the Nash equilibrium of the
proposed game.
Proof: According to DF scheme, we would assume that Rsp ≤ Rps in order to find the
relationship between α and β to facilitate the solution of the above optimization problem. We
can obtain the following relationship according to the assumption of DF scheme.
RSP = RPS ⇒ β = (1− α)
α
log2(1 + ρps)
log2(1 + ρsp)
. (28)
According to lemma 1, USSEC is strictly concave in terms of  for a given values of α and β.
Furthermore,RPSEC is an increasing function of α then the primary transmission (leader) will
select the best response ∗(α) of secondary transmission (follower) as
α∗ = argmaxRPSEC(α, ∗(α)). (29)
Therefore, α∗ and ∗(α∗) form the Nash equilibrium of the proposed Stackelberg game.
III. EXTENSION TO MULTIPLE EAVESDROPPERS (SCENARIO 2)
We consider Scenario 2 (see Fig. 2), by having multiple eavesdroppers which are located
in the range of the ST, to highlight the effect of multiple eavesdroppers on the secrecy rates.
In this case , we cannot consider same assumption as in Scenario 1 that all eavesdroppers are
located out of range of the PT, to enhance the secure transmission, we consider SR as jammer
with multiple transmit antennas and transmit jamming signal at phase I. The three phases for
both cases of colluding and non colluding eavesdroppers are considered. Furthermore, we derive
closed form expressions for both PSR and SSR in each case.
A. Case I: Colluding Eavesdroppers
In this case, all eavesdroppers are cooperated through a central processing so they can be
considered as a single eavesdropper with multiple antennas. Also, we assume that the eaves-
droppers are homogeneous, i.e., each eavesdropper experiences the same received signal power
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on average, and that all eavesdroppers are uniformly located around legitimate transmitter ST
[21].
1) Phase 1: We consider the PT cooperates with ST by allocated only a fraction (1 − α) of
the whole time slot whereas the SR, with multiple transmit antennas, sends the jamming signal
using power vector wJ to both of the ST and ED within the fraction (1−α). In this phase, the
received signal XST at the ST is
XST =
√
Pphpss+
√
PJhrswJzJ + nST , (30)
where h(rs) ∼ N (0K , d−δIK) is the channel vector (of length K due to K multiple transmit
antennas at SR) between SR and ST, zJ ∼ CN (0, 1), δ is the path loss exponent, d is the distance
between SR and ST and nST ∼ CN (0, σ2). The received signal at the EDi (where i = 1, 2, ..N )
in Phase 1 is
XPE,i =
√
Pphpes+
√
PJhrewJzJ + nED,i, (31)
where h(re) ∼ N (0K , d−δIK) is the channel vector (of length K due to K multiple transmit
antennas at SR) between SR and ST, nED,i ∼ CN (0, σ2). Using projection matrix theory to
remove an interference of SR (jammer) in legal receiver (ST) , we can achieve |wJ | as follows
|wJ | = (I− hrs(hrshrs
†)−1h†rs)hre∣∣∣((I− hrs(hrshrs†)−1h†rs)hre∣∣∣ , (32)
where |wJwJ †| = 1
Therefore, the information rate at ST is is given by (6) whereas the leakage rate at EDi can
be written as follows:
RPE,i = (1− α) log2
1 + Pphpe
σ2 + PJ
∣∣∣h†reWJhre∣∣∣
 , (33)
where WJ = wJwJ †.
2) Phase 2: The ST has DF relay function and forwards secure primary message sˆ to PR in
αβ in presence of L eavesdroppers according to a parameter 0 < β < 1. The received signal
XPR and rate RSP are given by (8) and (10) respectively due to canceling of artificial noise in
PR. Then the leakage rate RSEi at ith ED can be written as
RSE,i = αβ log2(1 +
Pshse
σ2 + PJ
∣∣∣h†reWJhre∣∣∣+ (1− )Pshse ), (34)
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where hse ∼ CN (0, σ2h) is the channel coefficient between ST and the ith ED. According to
[21] and [36], the authors take the sum of the signal to interference and noise ratio (SINR)s of
the colluding eavesdroppers due to their cooperation. In our paper, we assume that a central
processing unit will handle the sequential Markov chain observations among eavesdroppers
and according to [32], we can approximate (
∑L
i=1 log2(1 + SINRi))
∼= ∑Li=1 SINRi con-
sidering the approximation (log2(1 + SINRi)) ∼= SINRi for long distance transmissions or
energy-limited scenarios. Furthermore, this assumption represents worst case of eavesdroppers
(i.e.(
∑L
i=1 log2(1 + SINRi) > log2(1 +
∑L
i=1 SINRi))). Therefore, we rewrite RSE as
RSE =
L∑
i=1
RSE,i
(2)
=
L∑
i=1
αβ
log2(1 + Pshse
σ2 + PJ
∣∣∣h†reWJhre∣∣∣+ (1− )Pshse )
 . (35)
Also, the information rate RP at PR is given as
RP = min(RPS, RSP )
= min (log2(1 + ρps), log2(1 + ρsp)) . (36)
The achievable primary secrecy rate RPSEC can then be written as
RPSEC = αβ
Rp − L∑
i=1
log2(1 +
Pshse
σ2 + PJ
∣∣∣h†reWJhre∣∣∣+ (1− )Pshse )
 . (37)
2) Phase 3: The ST transmits secondary message to SR in time slot α(1− β) in the presence
of L eavesdroppers. The secondary receiver SR extracts only information signal, then the infor-
mation rate at the SR is given by (15), while the rate at multiple eavesdroppers is represented
as
RSE
(3) =
L∑
i=1
α(1− β)(log2(1 + Pshse
σ2 + PJ
∣∣∣h†reWJhre∣∣∣+ (1− )Pshse )
 . (38)
We can obtain secondary secrecy rate RSSEC by substituting Rss and Rse as
USSEC = RSSEC − k = RSS −R(3)SE − k
= α(1− β)(log2(1 + ρss)−
L∑
i=1
(α(1− β) (log2(1+
Pshse
σ2 + PJ
∣∣∣h†reWJhre∣∣∣+ (1− )Pshse )
− k. (39)
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Lemma 2. The utility of secondary transmission in colluding eavesdroppers that has the identical
channel gains of colluding eavesdroppers around legal transmitter are concave in terms of .
Proof: Since all eavesdroppers have identical channel gains around ST and SR, we can
consider that
|hse,1| = |hse,2| = ... = |hse,L|
which leads to
ρse,1 = ρse,2 = ... = ρse,L = ρse.
Also, we assume
|hre,1| = |hre,2| = ... = |hre,L|
Therefore, the achievable USSEC is written as
USSEC = Rssec − k = Rss −Rse − k
= α(1− β)(log2(1 + ρss)− log2(1 +
Pshse
σ2 + PJ
∣∣∣h†reWJhre∣∣∣+ (1− )Pshse )

− k. (40)
In order to prove the concavity of the secondary transmission’s utility, we derive the second
derivative of (40) with respect to  as
∂2USSEC
∂2
= q
 −ρ2ss
(1 + ρss)2
+
−Lρ2se
1 +
PJ |h†reWJhre|
σ2
+ (1− )ρse
 , (41)
where q = α(1 − β)/2 ln 2. Obviously, the second derivative in (41) is negative and therefore
the utility of secondary transmission in colluding eavesdroppers is concave in terms of .
We consider the same interaction between the primary and secondary transmissions as shown
in Fig. 3. This case reflects the impact of L eavesdroppers on the PSR and SSR. To find optimum
∗, we can differentiate USSEC with respect to . We assume ρre =
PJ |h†reWJhre|
σ2
for simplicity,
then the optimal ∗ is one of the positive real roots of a2 + b + c = 0, where a,b and c are
given as
a = ρssρse, (42)
b = ρse − ρss − ρssρse − ρssρre − (1 + L)ρssρseq
k
, (43)
c =
q
c1
(ρss − Lρse + ρssρse + ρssρre)− ρse − 1− ρre. (44)
Then we can apply theorem 1 to find optimum values of (α, β).
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B. Case 2: Non-colluding Eavesdroppers
We consider all eavesdroppers having non-homogeneous distribution around the ST (i.e.,
eavesdroppers are distributed randomly with different distances around the ST). In this case,
each eavesdropper will have their own information rate, denoted now by Rse,i, i = 1, 2, · · · , L.
Thus, we formulate the two following problems:
1) Problem 1: Maximizing PSR in Phase 2 for its worst case scenario:
max
0<α,β,<1
min
i
Rpsec,i (45)
where i = 1, 2, .., L,, Rpsec,i = Rps −Rse,i, and R(2)se,i is the leakage rate of the ith ED in Phase
2. Note that
min
i
Rpsec,i = Rps −max
i
R
(2)
se,i.
2) Problem 2: Maximizing SSR in Phase 3 for its worst case scenario:
max
0<α,β,<1
min
i
Rssec,i (46)
where Rssec,i = Rss−R(3)se,i and R(3)se,i is the leakage rate of the ith ED in Phase 3. Similarly, we
have
min
i
Rssec,i = Rss −max
i
R
(3)
se,i.
To solve the aforementioned two problems, we can consider standard max min problem. The
min problem is solved and then we can apply the proposed Stackelberg game based algorithm
in Scenario 1 to find the suboptimal values of α, β, and , which corresponds to the worst case
of eavesdropping.
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Fig. 4: Secrecy rate: comparison with jammer caused interference at legal receiver approach
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Fig. 5: Secrecy rate: comparison with friendly jammer without interference at legal receiver
approach
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we present the numerical results and related discussion. We consider the two
optimization problems from the previous sections according to the Stackelberg game. We studied
the secrecy performance under two scenarios: Scenario 1 and Scenario 2.
A. Scenario 1: Comparison with previous work:
In this section, we compare our proposed system with jammer that caused an interference
in legal receiver as in [13]. We consider the same setting used in this previous study in [13]:
Ps=2mw, noise variance σ2 =1mw, pricing factor k = 0.01, |hps|2 = 0.6, |hse|2 = 0.3 and
|hss|2 = 0.8. In [13], the authors considered two secondary users (one the relay and another for
jammer) in order to enhance the secrecy rates in primary transmission of CR. In this previous
study, there are two schemes which represented by relay and non friendly jammer (R-J) and
equal-duration relay non-friendly jammer (EDRJ). Note that the only difference between EDRJ
and R-J schemes is that in EDRJ scheme the time durations for the first two phases are equal
and the secrecy rate is maximized without considering time allocation. We now compare our
proposed scheme with these two schemes. Fig. 4 indicates that the proposed system outperforms
the R-J and EDRJ schemes significantly due to removal an interference of jamming signal in
legal destinations.
Furthermore, Fig.5 indicates the comparison between proposed system and equal-duration
relay jammer transmissions(EDJ) with respect to hse. EDJ scheme included the SR is treated
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Fig. 6: Secrecy rate versus distance of PT and ST
as a potential eavesdropper with respect to the primary transmission. Since the primary users
are the legacy owners of the spectrum, the confidentiality of the primary message should be
considered. In this context, the primary transmitter PT may be assisted by the trustworthy
secondary transmitter ST if the cooperation could improve the secrecy performance, while the ST
benefits as it is awarded a share of the spectrum for its data transmission. Therefore, ST is acted
as friendly jammer and the time duration of primary and jammer transmissions are same. This
scheme is similar to jammer’s operation in [11] except that EDJ doesn’t cause an interference in
legal transmitter. This comparison is performed to highlight the effect of an interaction between
the time and power allocation by Stackelberg game on performing balance process between
maximum values for both primary and secondary secrecy rates. We note that primary secrecy
rate of proposed system is slightly less than of friendly jammer especially in high channel
coefficient between legitimate transmitter and eavesdropper, whereas secondary secrecy rate of
proposed system is significantly higher than that of friendly jammer. Also, the proposed system
has the gap between the primary and secondary secrecy rates that less significantly than of EDJ
scheme. This feature which proves that the PSR and SSR of Stackelberg game is fairer than
that of EDJ due to the tradeoff between allocated power  and time durations α and β to obtain
maximum values for both primary and secondary secrecy rates.
B. Fixed locations of the PR, ST and SR:
We fix the PR, ST and SR locations at the coordinates (0, 0.6), (0, 0) and (0, 0.4), respectively,
to find the effect of PT and ED distances on the PSR and SSR. These coordinates are normalized
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Fig. 7: Secrecy rate versus distance between ED and ST
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to square area with 1km2. We assume path loss model hij = d−δ is used with path loss exponent
δ = 3. We also consider the primary and secondary signal to noise ratios (SNRs) are 5 dB and
the pricing coefficient is k = 0.25.
Fig.6 indicates the optimum primary and secondary secrecy rates with respect to distance
between PT and ST when the coordinates of the ED is fixed at (1, 0). It is noted that optimum
secrecy rates of both primary and secondary transmissions decrease when the PT is farther away
from the ST, , this is because of the decreasing ρps would reduce Rps according to (6). Therefore,
the information rate of relay (ST) decreases according to the condition Rsp ≤ Rps.
Fig. 7 shows the optimum PSR and SSR with respect to distance of the ED when the location
of the PT is fixed at (0.2, 0). It is noted that optimum secrecy rates of both primary and secondary
transmissions increase when the ED is further away from the ST because the information rate
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Fig. 9: α∗ and β∗ versus between PT and ST
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Fig. 10: α∗ and β∗ versus distance between ED and ST
of the ED decreases with degradation of hse according to (12) and (17). Figure 8 shows the
optimum  (power level fraction of the ST to carry the message signal) with respect to the
distance between the PT and ST when the coordinates of the ED is fixed at (1.0, 0). We find
that optimum  reduces when the PT is far away from the ST, this is because the received power
at the ST decreases with increasing the distance between ED and ST. On the other hand, this
figure shows the optimum  versus the distance between ED and ST when the coordinates of
the PT is fixed at (0,0.2). It is noted that optimum  increases when ED is farther from the ST,
this is because (1− ∗) decreases due to decreasing of the information rate of the ED.
Fig.9 shows the optimum α and β versus the distance between the PT and ST when the
coordinates of the ED is fixed at (1.0,0). We can find that β∗ slightly changes with the distance,
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Fig. 11: Primary secrecy rate versus ρsp
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Fig. 12: Secondary secrecy rate versus ρsp
whereas α∗ is significantly decreased with the distance for two reasons: firstly the activation time
of transmission between the PT and the relay is independent of β∗ according to (6); secondly,
the activation time of transmission between relay ST and PR decreases with increasing (1−α∗)
(time slot of transmission between the PT and relay) due to the degradation of hps and Rps
according to (6).
Figure 10 indicates that optimum α and β versus the distance between the ED and ST when
the coordinates of PT is (0,0.2). It is noted that β∗ is reduced significantly because hse has main
effect on relay and secondary transmissions in Phase 2 (β∗α∗) and Phase 3 α∗(1−β∗) according
to (12) and (17), respectively. In another observation, α∗ decreases less significantly because hse
has no effect on Phase 1 (1−α∗) of the primary transmission due to our assumption that primary
transmission is invisible at the ED.
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Fig. 13: Primary secrecy rate versus number of eavesdropper
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Fig. 14: Secondary secrecy rate versus number of eavesdropper
C. Fixed locations of the PT, PR, ST and SR:
The locations of the PT, PR, ST and SR are fixed at the coordinates (0,0.2),(0.6, 0), (0, 0)
and (0, 0.4), respectively, in order to find the effect of ρsp on the secrecy rates in two later
phases. We consider three schemes depending on locations of EDas follow: Scheme I (1.0,0),
Scheme II (0.9,0) and Scheme III (0.6,0). Figures 11 and 12 indicate the optimum primary and
secondary secrecy rates with respect to ρsp in these three schemes. It is noted that the optimum
secrecy rates of the three schemes increase significantly with ρsp according to (12) and (17),
respectively.
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Fig. 15: ∗ versus number of eavesdropper
D. Scenario 2
We consider same locations and parameters as in the preceding subsection with K=2. Figures
13 and 14 indicate that primary and secondary secrecy rates decrease significantly in both
cases with increasing number of eavesdroppers according to (37) and (40). We can also note
that scheme II (non-colluding eavesdroppers) has secrecy rate higher than scheme I (colluding
eavesdroppers) because scheme I combines the effects of all eavesdroppers whereas scheme II
picks the worst response (minimum secrecy rate) from one of the eavesdroppers.
Figure 15 shows that ∗ reduces significantly with increasing number of eavesdroppers, due
to the fact that more power should be allocated to the artificial noise with increasing the number
of eavesdroppers. Also, ∗ has higher level when the distance between ST and ED increases,
due to the fact that less power should be allocated to the artificial noise with reducing of Res1.
Figure 16 shows that α∗ increases significantly with increasing number of eavesdroppers
because we need to increase activation time of phases II and III to keep reasonable values of
secrecy rates with increasing the number of eavesdroppers. Furthermore, α∗ is needed to increase
with further distance between ST and ED.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a game theory based cooperation method to optimize the primary
secrecy rate and secondary secrecy rate in CRNs. This mechanism is built upon the spectrum
leasing paradigm, wherein a secondary transmitter is permitted to use some of its own power level
to transmit an artificial noise to destination(s) while the legitimate destination has prior knowledge
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of the artificial noise. Interaction between the cooperative nodes is based on the Stackelberg game
concept. We considered two scenarios, single eavesdropper and multiple eavesdroppers, where
we formulated and solved optimization problems in each scheme aiming at maximizing the
achievable secrecy rates on the primary and secondary transmissions subject to allocated power
and lease time slot constraints. Numerical results confirmed that our proposed cooperative scheme
significantly improves the secrecy rates of the CRNs. Furthermore, we remark numerically that
achievable PSR and SSR of Stackelberg game is fairer than that of other existing algorithms due
to the tradeoff between the allocated power and the time slot durations by Stackelberg game.
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